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Abstract
We evaluate the impact of dental insurance on the use of dental services using a potential 
outcomes identification framework designed to handle uncertainty created by unknown 
counterfactuals – that is, the endogenous selection problem – as well as uncertainty about the 
reliability of self-reported insurance status. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we 
estimate that utilization rates of adults older than 50 would increase from 75% to around 80% 
under universal dental coverage.
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I. Introduction
While there is a large literature evaluating the impact of health insurance on a wide variety 
of health related outcomes,1 very little attention has been paid to the role of dental insurance 
in the use of dental care (IOM and NRC, 2011). Yet many Americans suffer from serious 
oral health related problems. Nearly half of persons aged 65-74 perceive their dental health 
as poor, and one in four are classified as having severe periodontal disease (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 2000). A report of the Surgeon General (DHHS, 
2000) goes so far as to characterize oral disease in the United States as a “silent epidemic,” 
*This investigation was supported by the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health (R01 AG026090-01A2, 
Dental Coverage Transitions, Utilization and Retirement). The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors.
**Corresponding author jvpepper@virginia.edu. 
1See, e.g., the surveys by Gruber and Madrian (2004), Levy and Meltzer (2004), and Buchmueller et al. (2005).
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 July 01.
Published in final edited form as:
Health Econ. 2015 July ; 24(7): 840–858. doi:10.1002/hec.3064.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
and a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) notes that “little has 
changed in the intervening years” (IOM and NRC, 2011, p. 21). Both the Surgeon General 
and NAS reports highlight the potential role dental insurance – or the lack thereof – plays in 
understanding this epidemic. In particular, many fewer adults have dental insurance than 
have medical insurance (about 2.5 times more have medical insurance) and, since dental 
insurance is not provided through Medicare, coverage is often lost when individuals retire.2 
Thus, a clear and credible evaluation of the role of dental insurance on dental care is a 
critical step in understanding this epidemic and for understanding how insurance impacts 
general health and well-being in the United States.
Using data from the 2006 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), we examine 
how dental care utilization rates of adults older than 50 years would change under universal 
dental insurance coverage. Previous studies have found that dental insurance increases 
utilization. For example, focusing on youth and working aged adults, Mueller and Monheit 
(1988) conclude that dental insurance increases utilization from 0.47 to about 0.55, a nearly 
17 percent increase. A recent evaluation from Meyerhoefer, Zuvekas, and Manski (2014) 
finds that coverage increases the annual utilization rate by between 11 and 19 percent. Our 
analysis makes several notable contributions to this literature. At the most basic level, we 
provide one of the few recent evaluations of this important question; much of the literature is 
nearly three decades old and uses data from the 1970s or earlier.3 More importantly, in 
contrast to the existing literature which evaluates the impact of insurance on infants, youth, 
or working aged adults, we focus attention on older adults (age 50 and over), a 
subpopulation that is especially vulnerable to oral disease and often lacks dental insurance 
(especially retirees) (DHHS, 2000; IOM and NRC, 2011).
Finally, we use an innovative partial identification approach to address key identification 
problems that, for the most part, have been ignored in the literature. Drawing inferences on 
the effect of insurance on utilization is complicated by two fundamental identification 
problems. First, a selection problem arises because the decision to seek dental care and the 
decision to obtain dental insurance (or, more broadly, the circumstances under which 
individuals become insured) may be driven by similar unobserved factors. For example, 
expectations about future dental care needs, aversion to risk, and latent healthfulness are 
arguably correlated with both dental care utilization and dental insurance. Persons with 
greater needs or preferences for care may also be more likely to be insured (Meyerhoefer et 
al., 2014). As a result, the data alone cannot reveal what the utilization rate would be if more 
people were to be covered. While known to confound inferences about the impact of dental 
coverage on dental care, the empirical literature has largely ignored this selection problem 
(IOM and NRC, 2011, Chapter 5; Sintonen and Linnosmaa, 2000).4 In general, researchers 
have not been able to identify credible instrumental variables that are related to coverage but 
otherwise unrelated to utilization.
2A relatively large proportion of dental care expenses are paid out of pocket – just over 40% in 2010 – whereas only 9% of physician 
and clinical services were paid out of pocket (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2010).
3See, for example, Manning and Phelps, C.E. (1979), Hay et al. (1982), Gooch and Berkey (1987), Mueller and Monheit (1988), 
Reisine (1988) and Manning et al. (1987). Sintonen and Linnosmaa (2000) provide a review of this earlier literature. More recent 
studies include Meyerhoefer et al. (2014) and Munkin and Trivedi (2009).
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Second, a misclassification problem arises because dental insurance coverage is likely to be 
misreported by some respondents. Duncan and Hill's (1985) validation study of responses 
from workers at a large manufacturing firm provides direct evidence on misreporting: 
whereas only one percent of respondents at this firm misreported health insurance coverage, 
five percent of respondents provided erroneous reports of dental coverage. While direct 
evidence of dental coverage misreporting in the general population is limited, there is a large 
literature documenting the misclassification of health insurance coverage.5 Arguably, such 
measurement problems are magnified when considering dental insurance coverage which is 
sometimes a component of a larger insurance package provided by employers, and 
government-run insurance programs such as Medicaid and Medicare provide only limited 
coverage. The presence of reporting errors, which have been ignored in the existing dental 
health literature, compromises a researcher's ability to make reliable inferences about the 
status quo and further confounds identification of counterfactual outcomes associated with 
policies such as universal insurance (Kreider and Hill, 2009). Even infrequent response 
errors can have dramatic consequences for identifying causal relationships between 
treatments and outcomes (Kreider, 2010; Millimet, 2011). As a result, these measurement 
problems may constitute an important barrier to identifying the role of dental insurance in 
health care.
To address these two identification problems, we apply the partial identification methods in 
Kreider and Hill's (2009; henceforth referred to as KH) evaluation of universal health 
insurance.6,7 We focus on the relatively basic question of whether insurance effects 
utilization, a first order concern which is directly relevant for assessing the traditional dentist 
recommendation for biannual dental checkups (Patel et al., 2010).8 We estimate two basic 
parameters for the population of older adults: the true utilization gap between those with and 
without insurance, and the causal impact on utilization rates of providing universal dental 
coverage to the full population.9
After describing the data in Section II, Section III formalizes the problems associated with 
evaluating the gap in dental care use between the insured and uninsured. A number of 
studies have found coverage to be associated with higher rates of dental care utilization 
(Reisine, 1988; Gooch and Berkey 1987; Mueller and Monheit, 1988, Manski et al., 2002, 
4Exceptions include Munkin and Trivedi (2007) who address the selection problem using parametric instrumental variable models 
(also see Cooper, Manski, and Pepper, 2012), and Meyerhoefer et al. (2014) who use panel data methods. These observational studies 
conclude that the selection problem leads to a notable upward bias. In addition, The RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the 
mid-1970s applied a randomized design to evaluate the impact of insurance coverage on health care costs and utilization. Based on 
these data, Manning et al. (1987) find that lower coinsurance rates lead to increased dental care utilization. This experiment, however, 
did not focus on older adults, did not apply to persons without insurance, and may be outdated given the dramatic changes to the 
health care system in the United States (see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1993).
5See Section 2 for further discussion.
6Gerfin and Schellhorn (2006) also apply partial identification methods to evaluate the impact of health insurance deductibles on the 
probability of visiting a doctor.
7We also draw on the related partial identification literature in Manski (1995 and 1997), Manski and Pepper (2000 and 2009); Pepper 
(2000), Kreider and Pepper (2007); Molinari (2008 and 2010), and Kreider et al. (2012). Cooper et al.'s (forthcoming) analysis of the 
effect of dental insurance on dental care applies basic partial identification methods to address the selection problem.
8While the literature evaluating the demand for care has estimated two part models that jointly evaluate the probability of receiving 
any dental care and then consider the amount or type of care (Sintonen and Linnosmaa, 2000), this research does not address the 
selection and classification error problems.
9Future research might apply these partial identification methods to address intra-marginal questions about dental health, including the 
impact of insurance on the intensity of use (e.g. expenditures or number of visits) and moral hazard.
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Manski and Brown, 2007), but these studies do not address the problem that insurance status 
may be misclassified. Addressing the problem of classification errors in a binary regressor is 
known to be difficult. The classical measurement error model does not apply in our setting 
because reporting errors in a binary variable are mean reverting, the propensity to misreport 
might depend on true insurance status, and errors may be systematic in a particular direction. 
Instead, following KH, we bound the unknown true utilization gap under alternative 
assumptions about the nature and degree of reporting errors on dental insurance coverage.
We begin by allowing for arbitrary patterns of classification error under weak restrictions on 
the total degree of misreporting combined with “verification” assumptions that members of 
certain observed subgroups accurately report. This setting allows for the possibility that 
reporting errors are endogenously related to the true insurance status and dental care 
utilization. We then explore the identifying power of independence assumptions relating 
classification errors and outcomes including, for example, the nondifferential error model 
evaluated by Bollinger (1996) and Bound et al. (2001). In that model, insurance reporting 
errors arise independently of utilization outcomes after conditioning on true insurance status. 
Relaxing this assumption, we also consider the case that individuals who used dental 
services in the last year are (weakly) less likely to make mistakes in reporting their insurance 
status.
Moving beyond the descriptive utilization gap to a more policy relevant question, Section IV 
investigates what can be learned about the impact of universal dental insurance coverage on 
the use of dental care. In this section, we simultaneously address both identification 
problems by combining the classification error model assumptions with three common 
monotonicity assumptions in the treatment effects literature. We first apply the monotone 
treatment response (MTR) restriction (Manski, 1997) that having dental insurance would not 
decrease the likelihood of using dental care. We combine this assumption with the monotone 
treatment selection (MTS) restriction (Manski and Pepper, 2000) that the latent utilization 
probability is weakly larger for those who have obtained insurance. These assumptions rule 
out the possibility that being insured reduces the likelihood that a person uses dental services 
or that those who obtained coverage systematically had less proclivity to use dental services. 
We then apply a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) restriction that the latent use of 
dental care utilization weakly increases with family income. Given these assumptions, we 
bound the causal impact of universal coverage without relying on more controversial 
assumptions involving functional forms and independence conditions.
Section V draws conclusions. We find that universal dental insurance coverage would 
increase dental care utilization from the status quo rate of 0.752 by at least 2% and as much 
as 9%. These results are consistent with the utilization rate increasing from 75% to around 
80%.
II. Health and Retirement Study
To evaluate the impact of dental insurance coverage on utilization, we use data from the 
2006 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS, administered by the 
Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan and sponsored by the 
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National Institute on Aging, is a longitudinal household survey useful for the study of aging, 
retirement, and health among older populations in the United States.10 Every two years, 
individuals older than 50 and their spouses are surveyed by the HRS; approximately 20,000 
interviews are completed in each survey wave. Each respondent is asked a large battery of 
questions including information about demographics, income and assets, physical and 
mental health, dental care utilization, and dental care insurance coverage. We observe 
whether the respondent has lost his or her teeth. For our main analysis, we restrict the 
sample to only those who have teeth (20% dropped due to this restriction), in which case the 
final sample includes 12,746 older adults. In Section IV.C, we consider the impact of 
insurance on the edentulous using data on the 3,041 respondents without teeth.
Dental care is measured using a binary indicator of whether the individual reports receiving 
care during the two year period preceding the 2006 HRS interview. We also observe 
whether the respondent received care in the time period covered by the 2004 wave of the 
HRS and whether the respondent's spouse received care in the 2006 wave of the survey. As 
described in Section III below, these latter two measures are used to aid in “verifying” the 
accuracy of self-reports of dental insurance coverage. We assume these measures of dental 
care are measured accurately. Based on the 2006 survey, just over three-quarters of the 
population (0.752) received care within the two year period prior to the 2006 survey.
Dental insurance coverage is identified in one of two ways: either (1) the respondent 
reported seeing a dentist during the two-year period preceding the survey and having 
expenses at least partially covered by insurance, or (2) the respondent did not see a dentist 
but reported that he or she would expect some of the costs to be covered by insurance. We 
classify the remainder of the sample as uninsured for dental services. Based on this 
classification, 46.1% of the population reports having dental insurance coverage.
Some of these self-reported measures of dental insurance status, however, are thought to 
contain classification errors. There is a large literature documenting the misclassification of 
health insurance status. Significant misreporting has been documented in the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey, the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS), and other surveys (Davern et al. 2007a; Card et al. 2004; Hill, 2007; 
Nelson et al. 2000). Some evidence on misreporting pertains to reports on the type of 
coverage (e.g., private versus public) instead of coverage status itself. Nelson et al. (2000), 
for example, finds evidence of substantial misreporting on the source of coverage but more 
modest error rates (about 3%) on coverage status (see also Davern et al., 2008). Other 
evidence, however, reveals concerning amounts of misreporting on coverage status. Hill 
(1997), for example, finds that false negative reports in the MEPS – i.e., covered persons 
reporting no coverage – may be substantial (see also Davern et al., 2007b). Finally, as noted 
above, Duncan and Hill (1985) find that 5% of respondents from a large manufacturing firm 
provide erroneous reports about dental coverage. While we are not aware of more recent 
studies that provide direct evidence on misreporting of dental insurance coverage, the risk of 
10We use the RAND HRS Data, Version H, produced by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, with funding from the National 
Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration, Santa Monica, CA (February 2008 ).
Kreider et al. Page 5
Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 July 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
measurement problems are heightened in this application: dental coverage is often a 
relatively small component of a larger insurance package provided by employers, and 
coverage is not included in Medicare.
Table 1 displays means and standard errors for the variables used in this study. The 
estimates in this table (and elsewhere in the paper) are weighted to account for the survey 
design used in the HRS. Just over half the sample reports having dental insurance. 
Consistent with previous work on this topic, the use of dental care is much more prevalent 
for those reporting to be insured. In particular, 83.6% of respondents reporting to be insured 
received dental care, whereas only 66.4% of respondents reporting to be uninsured received 
dental care. Thus, the estimated utilization gap in the absence of misreporting is about 17 
percentage points.
III. Identifying Utilization Differences Between the Insured and Uninsured
We first study what can be learned about the utilization gap – that is, the difference in dental 
care utilization rates between the insured and uninsured – when true insurance status may be 
unknown. In Section IV, we extend the analysis to assess what can be learned about the 
causal impact of universal dental insurance coverage on the use of dental services. Let I* = 1 
indicate that a person is truly insured, with I* = 0 otherwise. Instead of observing I*, we 
observe the self-reported indicator of coverage, I. A latent variable Z* indicates whether a 
report is accurate. If I and I* coincide, then Z* = 1; otherwise, Z* = 0. Let V = 1 indicate that 
I is verified to be accurate (i.e., Z* is known to equal 1). If V = 0, then Z* may be either 1 or 
0. Let D = 1 denote that the respondent received dental care in the last year, with D = 0 
otherwise. Then, the utilization gap between the insured and uninsured can be written as:
(1)
where true insurance status, I*, may be unobserved. Thus, the utilization gap Δ is not 
identified since we observe E(D |I) but not E(D|I*).
To formalize this identification problem, consider the first term in Equation (1) which can be 
written as
(2)
Neither the numerator nor the denominator is identified. To see this identification problem, 
it is useful to decompose the conditional probability into observed and unobserved 
quantities. Let
denote the fraction of false positive and false negative classifications of dental insurance 
coverage, respectively, for respondents receiving dental care. Similarly, let respondents not 
receiving dental care. Similarly, let θ0+ ≡ P(D = 0, I = 1, Z* = 0) and θ0– ≡ P(D = 0, I = 1, 
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Z* = 0) denote the analogous fractions for respondents not receiving dental care. Then, it 
follows that
(3)
where p11 = P( D = 1, I = 1) and p1( I = 1) are identified by the data. In the numerator, θ1− – 
θ1+ reflects the unobserved excess of false negative versus false positive classifications 
among those who received health care. In the denominator, θ1− + θ0− –θ1+ –θ0+ reflects the 
unobserved excess of false negative versus false positive classifications within the entire 
population. Dental care among the uninsured can be decomposed in a similar fashion.
To draw inferences on the utilization gap, assumptions on the pattern and degree of 
classification errors are used to place meaningful restrictions the unobserved quantities, θ. 
We start by maintaining the following basic assumption:
(A1)
where v is a known or conjectured lower bound on the degree of accurate reporting. 
Assumptions (A1a) and (A1b) bound the degree of accurate reporting among unverified (V = 
0) and verified (V=1) respondents, respectively. The previous literature has maintained the 
implicit assumption of fully accurate reporting, in which case v is implicitly assumed to 
equal 1. In the current analysis, this accurate reporting assumption is maintained for verified 
respondents but not for the unverified. Instead, we assess the sensitivity of inferences to 
classification errors among unverified reports by varying v between 0.5 and 1. Restricting 
attention to values of v larger than 0.5 presumes only that the self-reports of insurance status 
contain more information about the truth than random guessing.
Proposition 1 in KH provides analytic bounds on the true utilization gap under Assumption 
A1. These bounds allow for arbitrary patterns of insurance classification errors among 
unverified cases, including the possibility that reporting errors are endogenously related to 
true insurance status and the use of dental services.
Given the lack of research on the misclassification of dental insurance in self-reported 
surveys, we have no direct information on which respondents provide an accurate report. 
Thus, rather than presenting a single model of misclassification, we instead assess how 
identification varies with the strength of assumptions on misreporting patterns. A natural 
starting point is to consider the case where there is no prior information revealing 
respondents who provide accurate reports. In this case, all responses are unverified and 
Assumption (A1a) applies to the full sample.
To verify responses, we use information on whether the respondent recently received dental 
care. Arguably, respondents who have received dental care are likely to know about their 
dental insurance coverage. We apply two nested verification models. First, we assume that 
respondents who report seeing a dentist and having expenses at least partially covered by 
insurance provide accurate reports of dental coverage. Of the 12,746 respondents in our 
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sample, 4,775 report receiving care that is at least partly covered by insurance, 1,094 
respondents did not see a dentist but reported that they would expect costs to be covered by 
insurance, and the remaining 6,877 did not report having dental insurance. Thus, under this 
verification model 4,775 respondents – 37% – are assumed to provide accurate reports of 
coverage. Assumption (A1a) applies to the reports of the remaining 7,871 unverified cases. 
Second, we strengthen this verification assumption by presuming accurate responses among 
those who either report receiving care in the previous two waves of the HRS (i.e., the 2006 
or 2004 wave) or report that their spouse received care in the 2006 wave. Under this more 
restrictive model, we verify the self-reports of dental insurance for 11,914 respondents. That 
is, 93.5% are assumed to provide accurate reports of insurance coverage. The remaining 832 
unverified respondents (i.e., 6.5% of the sample) may misreport subject to the constraint in 
Assumption (A1a).
To further tighten inferences on the utilization gap, we consider restrictions on the patterns 
of errors. We first consider two independence assumptions:
(A2)
(A3)
Assumption (A2) formalizes an independence assumption that insurance classification errors 
occur independently of true insurance status. That is, the propensity to misreport insurance 
status does not depend on whether the respondent is truly insured or not. This assumption is 
obviously weaker than the usual implicit assumption of no reporting errors. Still, the 
assumption will be violated, for example, if better educated respondents are both more likely 
to be insured and more likely to accurately answer survey questions (KH).
Assumption (A3) places restrictions on the relationship between insurance classification 
errors and the use of health services. Conditional on true insurance status, reporting errors 
are assumed to be unrelated to the respondent's use of dental services. Aigner (1973) and 
Bollinger (1996) study this type of “nondifferential” classification error for the case of a 
binary conditioning variable. When (A3) holds, Bollinger's Theorem 1 (for v > 0.5) shows 
that Δ is bounded below by the reported utilization gap, P(D = 1|I = 1) – P(D = 1|I = 0). 
Bound et al. (2001, p. 3725) note, however, that in general the nondifferential measurement 
error assumption is strong and often implausible. In our context, the nondifferential 
assumption may be violated if using dental care informs respondents about their true 
insurance status. In fact, our verification assumptions are predicated on the idea that using 
dental services resolves uncertainty about insurance status.
While the nondifferential errors assumption is quite strong, the assumption can be weakened 
considerably. Instead of assuming independence between insurance misreporting and the use 
of services, Assumption (A4) merely rules out patterns of errors in which the probability of 
misreporting insurance status rises with the level of dental health care utilization:
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(A4)
It seems plausible that, on average, respondents who recently used dental services are at 
least as likely as their non-using counterparts to accurately report their insurance status. The 
nondifferential assumption (A3) represents a special case in which these inequalities are 
replaced with equalities.
Empirical results
Figures 1A-1C present the estimated bounds on the utilization gap, Δ, with Panel A 
displaying the bounds under the assumption that none of the self-reports of insurance status 
are verified to be accurate. These bounds account only for identification uncertainty and 
abstract away from the additional layer of uncertainty associated with sampling variability. 
The accompanying table presents the estimated bounds for the selected values v = {0.75, 
0.90, 0.95, 1.00} and also provides Imbens-Manski (2004) confidence intervals that cover 
the true value of Δ with 95% probability. So, for example, the results found under v = 0.95 
apply if the direct evidence on misreporting provided in Duncan and Hill's (1985) analysis 
of workers at one large manufacturing firm holds for the full population.
When v = 1, Δ is point-identified as the self-reported gap obtained from taking the data at 
face value. In this case, the utilization gap is estimated to be 0.836 - 0.664 = 0.172. Under 
arbitrary errors, identification of the utilization gap deteriorates rapidly as v departs from 1. 
When v = 0.95, for example, the utilization gap in dental care may lie anywhere between 
0.021 and 0.324, and when v = 0.90 (or smaller), the sign of Δ is no longer identified to be 
positive. This represents an important negative result: even small amounts of classification 
errors may lead to ambiguity about inferences on the sign of the utilization gap between the 
insured and uninsured (KH). While this negative result persists under the orthogonal errors 
(A2) and nonincreasing error (A4) models, Δ is always estimated to exceed zero under the 
nondifferential errors (A3) model. As noted above, the estimated lower bound under (A3) 
equals the reported utilization gap (Bollinger, 1996).
Figures 1B and 1C incorporate the two nested verification models. Under the weaker 
verification assumption, Figure 1B displays results for the case that insurance responses can 
be treated as accurate among respondents who report having dental care expenses partially 
covered by insurance. Under the stronger verification assumption, Figure 1C displays results 
under the assumption that insurance responses can be treated as accurate among those who 
received care in either of the previous two waves of the HRS (i.e., the 2006 or 2004 wave) 
or their spouse received care in the 2006 wave. In this latter case, the utilization gap is 
estimated to be positive unless nearly half the 6.5% of unverified respondents may 
misreport. Moreover, the gap is point-identified to equal the self-reported rate of 0.172 in the 
nondifferential errors models for all displayed values of v, and it is nearly point-identified 
under the orthogonal errors model. Thus, under these verification restrictions, the utilization 
gap is found to be positive and, under traditional measurement error models, close to the 
reported gap of 0.172. So, even if we allow for some misclassification, the estimates from 
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these models imply that the insured are at least 8% and at most 27% more likely to use 
dental care than the uninsured.
IV. Utilization under Universal Health Insurance
We now examine how the fraction of the population using dental services might change if 
dental insurance coverage where to be extended to the uninsured. Our primary analysis 
focuses on the full sample of adults with teeth. In Section IV.C, we provide separate 
estimates for the subsamples of adult without teeth and adults over 64 years of age.
Let D(I* = 1) indicate whether the individual would have used dental services if insured. 
Our objective is to compare the utilization probability if everyone were to be insured, 
P[D(I* = 1) = 1], to the status quo utilization rate, P(D =1). The identification problem is 
that the utilization outcome under universal insurance, I[D(I* = 1) = 1], is observed only for 
respondents who are verified to be insured (I* = 1 and V = 1). We do not observe D(I* = 1) 
if I* = 0 since in that case this quantity represents an unknown counterfactual outcome. Nor 
is this quantity observed in the presence of classification errors since we do not know the 
value of I*.
Our notation leaves implicit any other covariates of interest. In a usual regression 
framework, the inclusion of additional observed covariates is motivated as a means of 
controlling for other factors that may influence utilization outcomes; omitting relevant 
explanatory variables may lead to biased estimates. In contrast, there are no regression 
orthogonality conditions to be satisfied in our approach. Instead, conditioning on covariates 
serves only to define subpopulations of interest, and our problem is welldefined regardless 
of how the subpopulations are specified (Pepper 2000). Our models condition on age and 
whether the respondent has teeth. In Section IV.C, we evaluate other subpopulations of 
respondents.
If dental insurance status were randomly assigned, then the utilization rate among the 
insured, P(D = 1|I* = 1), would identify the utilization rate under universal coverage. As 
discussed earlier, however, dental insurance coverage is not randomly assigned. Instead, 
insurance status is affected by characteristics potentially related to the use of dental care. 
Thus, the quantity P[D(I* = 1) = 1] is not identified even if reported insurance status is 
always accurate.
A. MTR and MTS Assumptions
A natural starting point is to consider what can be inferred about the potential utilization 
probability if no assumptions are imposed to address the selection problem. To do so, we 
apply Proposition 2 in KH. We then consider two common monotonicity assumptions – one 
for treatment response and one for treatment selection.
The monotone treatment response assumption (MTR), introduced by Manski (1997) (see 
also Pepper 2000), specifies that an individual's likelihood of using dental services is at least 
as high in the insured state as in the uninsured state:
Kreider et al. Page 10
Health Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 July 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
(A5)
Given moral hazard, we would expect some individuals to increase their use of dental care 
services upon becoming insured; at any rate, their use of services presumably would not 
decline.11 Under this MTR assumption, the utilization probability under universal insurance 
is restricted to be no less than the status quo probability of 0.752.
Under the monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption introduced in Manski and 
Pepper (2000), the probability of using dental care services under either “treatment” (insured 
or uninsured) would be at least as high among the currently insured as among the currently 
uninsured:
(A6)
Proposition 3 in KH provides bounds on the latent utilization probability P[D(I* = 1) = 1] 
under the joint MTR and MTS assumptions.
The MTS assumption relaxes the commonly imposed “exogenous treatment selection” 
(ETS) assumption (see Manski and Pepper 2000, p. 1001). Using traditional parametric 
models, Munkin and Trivedi (2009) and Meyerhoefer et al. (2014) find strong support for 
this selection model. Those who are likely to use dental services either because of need or 
preferences also tend to self-select themselves into obtaining insurance.12 For example, a 
traditional adverse selection model implies that persons in need of dental care are likely to 
purchase dental insurance, while a preference based model implies that persons who are risk 
adverse or who are healthful may be insured and receive dental care.
In the status quo, where some people have dental insurance and others do not, the dental 
care utilization rate is estimated to be 0.752. We are interested in comparing this status quo 
rate to the fraction of the population that would receive care under a policy of universal 
dental insurance coverage. We first consider what can be learned about the utilization rate 
under the weakest modeling assumptions – that is, allowing for arbitrary patterns of 
insurance classification errors while imposing no restrictions on the selection process. 
Estimates of these bounds, along with 95% confidence intervals, are presented in Figure 2 
and column 1 of the associated tables. Figure 2A displays the bounds under the assumption 
that no self-reports of insurance status are verified to be accurate, while Figures 2B and 2C 
incorporate the nested verification models.
11This leads to an MTR restriction that insurance weakly increases the demand for care, a property that holds even without moral 
hazard. A basic economic model of dental care utilization is provided by Meyerhoefer et al. (2014). See also Manning and Phelps 
(1979) and Sintonen and Linnosmaa (2000).
12Observed features of economic well-being and health, including self-reported measures of health, education, employment, and 
earnings, are all positively correlated with both dental insurance and dental care utilization (Manski et al., 2010a). While these 
observed associations may suggest that an adverse selection model is not applicable to all groups of respondents (persons with 
insurance have better, not worse, self-reported measures of health), it does not invalidate the MTS assumption. In particular, the MTS 
assumption holds if adverse selection applies to some respondents and preference based selection applies to others. Moreover, in 
imposing the MTS assumption across the population as a whole, we allow for the possibility that this tendency is reversed within some 
subpopulations.
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Under the standard assumption that insurance status is reported accurately, v = 1, the dental 
care utilization rate if everyone were to become insured is estimated to lie in the range 
[0.429, 0.916]. Thus, the data cannot reveal whether universal coverage increases or 
decreases utilization compared to the status quo rate, 0.752. Utilization rates might fall to the 
lower bound of 0.429 or rise to the upper bound of 0.916. Clearly, in the absence of 
additional restrictions to address the selection problem, we learn very little about the impact 
of universal dental insurance coverage. Moreover, as the accurate reporting rate v departs 
from 1, the estimated bounds become even wider.
The ambiguity associated with the dental care utilization rate under universal coverage can 
be substantially reduced, however, by applying credible restrictions. Consider, for example, 
the results illustrated in Figure 2C where respondents are verified to provide accurate reports 
of dental insurance if they or their spouse received dental care. Under this verification 
model, the estimated bounds when v=0.95 narrow from [0.379, 1.00] to [0.429, 0.922], a 21 
percent reduction in the width of the bounds. Adding the MTR and MTS assumptions to 
address the selection problem further reduces the ambiguity associated with universal 
coverage; the lower bound increases to the observed status quo utilization rate of 0.752, 
while the upper bound falls to 0.847. Thus, under this model, we estimate that universal 
coverage would increase the dental care utilization rate by no more than 0.095 (from 0.752 
to 0.847), a 13% increase. This finding appears to be fairly robust. The lower bound is 
constant across all measurement error models, and the upper bound estimates vary only 
slightly (at the second decimal place) across the different error models.
B. Monotone Instrumental Variables
Researchers often address selection and misclassification problems using an instrumental 
variable assumption that certain observed covariates are mean independent of the latent 
outcome of interest. While this instrumental variable assumption is known to have 
identifying power (Manski, 1995), in practice finding credible instruments can be difficult. 
Observed variables that are correlated with dental insurance coverage are also thought to be 
related to the latent dental care indicator, D(I*), as well. As a result, we have not found an 
instrumental variable for this application that plausibly satisfies the mean independence 
restriction.
Instead, however, the weaker monotone instrumental variable (MIV) restriction that certain 
observed covariates are known to be monotonically related to the latent response variable 
can be credibly applied in this setting. In particular, we consider the relatively innocuous 
assumption that the latent utilization probability under universal coverage weakly increases 
with income adjusted for family composition. A large body of empirical research supports 
the idea of a negative gradient between reported income and dental health care utilization 
(e.g., Manski et al., 2010b). To formalize this idea, let w be the monotone instrumental 
variable such that
(4)
This mean monotonicity condition relaxes the mean independence assumption in which the 
inequalities across the expectations in (4) would be replaced with equalities (Manski and 
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Pepper, 2000 and 2009). Although the conditional expectations in (4) are not identified, they 
can be bounded using the methods described above. Let LB(u) and UB(u) be the known 
lower and upper bounds evaluated at w = u, respectively, given the available information. 
Then the MIV assumption formalized in Manski and Pepper (2000, Proposition 1) implies:
Bounds on the unconditional utilization rate under universal coverage, P[D(I*=1) = 1] are 
then obtained using the law of total probability.13
Estimates of these bounds and confidence intervals around the true value P[D(I*=1) = 1] 
under this MIV assumption are presented in Table 2, which reveals the bounds under the 
strongest verification model and the joint MTS-MTR assumption. The MTS assumption 
applies at each value of the instrument, w. In this model, the dental care utilization rate 
under universal insurance, P[D(I*=1) = 1], is estimated to exceed the status quo rate of 
0.752 by at least 0.012 (a 1.6% increase), although this lower bound result is not statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. The MIV assumption also reduces the estimated 
upper bound. When v = 0.95 and reporting errors can be arbitrary, for example, the upper 
bound on the utilization rate under universal coverage falls from 0.847 to 0.822. Depending 
on the measurement error model, the upper bound varies from 0.809 (under the 
nondifferential errors model) to 0.885 (under the arbitrary errors model where v = 0.75). 
Despite the sensitivity of the upper bound estimates, the overall results are fairly consistent. 
Relative to the status quo utilization rate of 0.752, we estimate that universal coverage 
would increase the dental care utilization rate by at least 0.012, or 2%, and no more than 
about 0.08, or 10%.
These results are consistent with, but somewhat smaller, than analogous results found in the 
literature using parametric models to evaluate the impact of insurance on younger 
populations. As noted above, Mueller and Monheit (1988) conclude that dental insurance 
increases utilization from 0.47 to about 0.55, a nearly 17 percent increase, and Meyerhoefer, 
Zuvekas, and Manski (2014) find that coverage increases the probability of preventive care 
by about 19 percent (from a base of 0.41). Thus, our results suggest that while older adults 
are more likely to use dental care, utilization decisions may be somewhat less sensitive to 
dental insurance.
C. Subgroups Analysis
Thus far, our analysis has focused on evaluating the average effect of insurance for the full 
population of adults with teeth. In this section, we report estimates under the MTR-MTS-
MIV model for two subpopulations: toothless adults and persons aged 65 or older. 
13Following the approach developed in Kreider and Pepper (2007), we estimate these MIV bounds by first dividing the sample into 
equally sized groups (more than 200 observations per cell) delineated by an increasing ratio of income to the poverty line. Then, to 
find the MIV bounds on the rates of dental care utilization, we take the average of the plug-in estimators (weighted to account for the 
survey design) of lower and upper bounds across the different income groups observed in the data. Since this MIV estimator is 
consistent but biased in finite samples (see Manski and Pepper, 2000 and 2009), we employ Kreider and Pepper's (2007) modified 
MIV estimator that accounts for the finite sample bias using a nonparametric bootstrap correction method.
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Edentulous individuals are likely to have important but very different dental care needs than 
the general population, and thus are treated separately. Likewise, the oldest individuals in 
the sample – those 65 and over – may have more acute dental health problems and face 
different dental insurance coverage options than those under 65.
Table 3 displays the results for these subpopulations. For toothless adults (Panel A), the 
estimated lower bound under universal insurance, P[D(I*=1) = 1], equals the status quo 
utilization rate of 0.207. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that insurance has no 
impact on the dental care utilization rate for toothless adults over 51 years of age. At the 
same time, the upper bound estimates imply that insurance may have a substantial effect. 
For example, if v = 0.90, the estimated upper bound varies from 0.250 (under the 
nondifferential errors model) to 0.299 (under the arbitrary errors model).
For adults age 65 or older with teeth (Panel B), the status quo utilization rate is estimated to 
equal 0.744. Under universal insurance, we estimate the utilization rate, P[D(I*=1) = 1], to 
exceed the status quo rate by at least 0.005, although this lower bound result is not 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The upper bound estimates vary from 
0.763 (under the nondifferential errors model) to 0.842 (under the arbitrary errors model 
where v = 0.75). Despite the sensitivity of the upper bound estimates, the overall results are 
fairly consistent. Relative to the status quo utilization rate of 0.744, we estimate that 
universal coverage may have a very limited impact on the dental care utilization rate but 
may also increase this rate by as much as 0.098, or 13%. For comparison purposes, the last 
two panels provide analogous estimates for adults age 65 and older with no teeth (Panel C) 
and for all adults 65 and older (Panel D). Patterns are similar to those described above.
V. Conclusion
Oral health is thought to be an integral part of general health and well-being, yet most adults 
display signs of dental diseases and nearly one-fourth of the elderly have severe periodontal 
disease (DHHS, 2001). Many Americans do not maintain oral health, even though it can 
often be achieved with minimal care. In this paper, we examine how universal dental care 
insurance would impact the utilization of dental care. Identifying the impact of universal 
coverage is confounded by both the unobservability of counterfactuals and the potential 
unreliability of self-reported insurance status. To account for these two distinct types of 
uncertainty, we apply a nonparametric framework from Kreider and Hill (2009) that allows 
us to partially identify probability distributions and treatment effects.
Using this approach, we provide tight bounds on the impact of universal health insurance on 
dental care utilization. The resulting estimates imply that extending coverage to the 
uninsured would increase the utilization rate by at least 2% under universal coverage and as 
much as about 10%. These results are consistent with the dental care utilization rate 
increasing from 75% to around 80%.
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Figure 1A. 
Gap Between the Insured and Uninsured in the Probability of Using Dental Services: (i)No 
verification
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Figure 1B. 
Gap Between the Insured and Uninsured in the Probability of Using Dental Services: (ii) 
Insurance Status Verified if Saw Dentist and Reported Coverage
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Figure 1C. 
Gap Between the Insured and Uninsured in the Probability of Using Dental Services: (iii) 
Verified if Saw Dentist in Previous Two Waves or Spouse Saw in Previous Wave
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Figure 2A. 
Bounds on the Fraction of the Population that Would Have Used Dental Services Under 
Universal Dental Insurance Coverage:
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Figure 2B. 
Bounds on the Fraction of the Population that Would Have Used Dental Services Under 
Universal Dental Insurance Coverage:
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Figure 2C. 
Bounds on the Fraction of the Population that Would Have Used Dental Services Under 
Universal Dental Insurance Coverage:
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Table 1
Means by Reported Dental Insurance Status
Variable Full Sample Reportedly Insured (I=1) Reportedly Uninsured (I =0)
Ratio of income to the poverty line 6.77 (0.30) 7.05 (0.12) 6.47 (0.57)
Dental Insurance (2004-06) 0.513 (0.004)
Used Dental Care (2004-06) 0.752 (0.004) 0.836 (0.005) 0.664 (0.006)
Used Dental Care (2002-04) 0.756 (0.004) 0.825 (0.005) 0.684 (0.006)
Spouse Used Dental Care (2004-06) 0.751 (0.005) 0.827 (0.006) 0.662 (0.007)
Sample Size 12,746 5,869 6,877
Notes: Sample estimates are weighted using the survey respondent weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2
Bounds on the Fraction of the Population that Would Have Used Dental Services Under Universal Dental 
Insurance Coverage (iii) MIV, Verified if Saw Dentist in Previous Two Waves or Spouse Saw in Previous 
Wave
MIV+MTR+MTS
Arbitrary Errors Orthogonal Errors Nondifferential Errors Nonincreasing Errors
v=1 [0.764, 0.809] [0.764, 0.809] [0.764, 0.809] [0.764, 0.809] p.e.†
[0.743 0.860] [0.743 0.860] [0.743 0.860] [0.743 0.860] CI‡
[0.016 −0.035] [0.016 −0.035] [0.016 −0.035] [0.016 −0.035] bias*
v=0.95 [0.764, 0.822] [0.764, 0.812] [0.764, 0.809] [0.764, 0.821] p.e.
[0.743 0.874] [0.743 0.863] [0.743 0.860] [0.743 0.872] CI
[0.016 −0.036] [0.016 −0.036] [0.016 −0.035] [0.016 −0.036] bias
v=0.90 [0.764, 0.837] [0.764, 0.816] [0.764, 0.809] [0.764, 0.836] p.e.
[0.743 0.889] [0.743 0.868] [0.743 0.860] [0.743 0.888] CI
[0.016 −0.038] [0.016 −0.036] [0.016 −0.035] [0.016 −0.038] bias
v=0.75 [0.764, 0.885] [0.764, 0.831] [0.764, 0.809] [0.764, 0.884] p.e.
[0.743 0.938] [0.743 0.883] [0.743 0.860] [0.743 0.936] CI
[0.016 −0.047] [0.016 −0.039] [0.016 −0.035] [0.016 −0.046] bias
Notes:
†
Point estimates (p.e.)
‡95% Imbens-Manski confidence intervals (CI) using 1,000 pseudosamples
*
Estimated finite sample bias used to correct estimates.
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Table 3
Bounds on the Fraction of the Population that Would Have Used Dental Services Under Universal Dental 
Insurance Coverage (iii) MIV, Verified if Saw Dentist in Previous Two Waves or Spouse Saw in Previous 
Wave
A. Aged 51 and Older, No Teeth (N = 3041)
MIV+MTR+MTS
Arbitrary Errors Orthogonal Errors Nondifferential Errors Nonincreasing Errors
v=1 [0.207, 0.250] [0.207, 0.250] [0.207, 0.250] [0.207, 0.250] p.e.
[0.162 0.321] [0.162 0.321] [0.162 0.321] [0.162 0.321] CI
[0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.022] bias
v=0.95 [0.207, 0.273] [0.207, 0.260] [0.207, 0.250] [0.207, 0.273] p.e.
[0.162 0.352] [0.162 0.334] [0.162 0.321] [0.162 0.351] CI
[0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.024] [0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.025] bias
v=0.90 [0.207, 0.299] [0.207, 0.270] [0.207, 0.250] [0.207, 0.298] p.e.
[0.162 0.386] [0.162 0.349] [0.162 0.321] [0.162 0.385] CI
[0.015 −0.028] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.028] bias
v =0.75 [0.207, 0.408] [0.207, 0.308] [0.207, 0.250] [0.207, 0.406] p.e.
[0.162 0.530] [0.162 0.406] [0.162 0.321] [0.162 0.527] CI
[0.015 −0.048] [0.015 −0.030] [0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.047] bias
B. Aged 65 and Older, Teeth (N = 7653)
v=1 [0.749, 0.763] [0.749, 0.763] [0.749, 0.763] [0.749, 0.763] p.e.
[0.723 0.822] [0.723 0.822] [0.723 0.822] [0.723 0.822] CI
[0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.025] bias
v=0.95 [0.749, 0.781] [0.749, 0.771] [0.749, 0.763] [0.749, 0.781] p.e.
[0.723 0.842] [0.723 0.830] [0.723 0.822] [0.723 0.841] CI
[0.015 −0.027] [0.015 −0.026] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.026] bias
v=0.90 [0.749, 0.802] [0.749, 0.780] [0.749, 0.763] [0.749, 0.801] p.e.
[0.723 0.864] [0.723 0.840] [0.723 0.822] [0.723 0.863] CI
[0.015 −0.029] [0.015 −0.027] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.029] bias
v=0.75 [0.749, 0.842] [0.749, 0.796] [0.749, 0.763] [0.749, 0.841] p.e.
[0.723 0.912] [0.723 0.860] [0.723 0.822] [0.723 0.910] CI
[0.015 −0.027] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.025] [0.015 −0.027] bias
C. Aged 65 and Older, No Teeth (N = 2456)
MIV+MTR+MTS
Arbitrary Errors Orthogonal Errors Nondifferential Errors Nonincreasing Errors
v=1 [0.173, 0.216] [0.173, 0.216] [0.173, 0.216] [0.173, 0.216] p.e.
[0.132 0.293] [0.132 0.293] [0.132 0.293] [0.132 0.293] CI
[0.015 −0.021] [0.015 −0.021] [0.015 −0.021] [0.015 −0.021] bias
v=0.95 [0.173, 0.241] [0.173, 0.228] [0.173, 0.216] [0.173, 0.241] p.e.
[0.132 0.329] [0.132 0.311] [0.132 0.293] [0.132 0.329] CI
[0.015 −0.024] [0.015 −0.022] [0.015 −0.021] [0.015 −0.024] bias
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C. Aged 65 and Older, No Teeth (N = 2456)
MIV+MTR+MTS
Arbitrary Errors Orthogonal Errors Nondifferential Errors Nonincreasing Errors
v=0.90 [0.173, 0.276] [0.173, 0.245] [0.173, 0.216] [0.173, 0.276] p.e.
[0.132 0.377] [0.132 0.335] [0.132 0.293] [0.132 0.376] CI
[0.015 −0.028] [0.015 −0.024] [0.015 −0.021] [0.015 −0.028] bias
v =0.75 [0.173, 0.453] [0.173, 0.332] [0.173, 0.216] [0.173, 0.450] p.e.
[0.132 0.606] [0.132 0.456] [0.132 0.293] [0.132 0.602] CI
[0.015 −0.059] [0.015 −0.036] [0.015 −0.021] [0.015 −0.058] bias
D. Aged 65 and Older, With or Without Teeth (N = 10,109)
MIV+MTR+MTS
Arbitrary Errors Orthogonal Errors Nondifferential Errors Nonincreasing Errors
v=1 [0.622, 0.657] [0.622, 0.657] [0.622, 0.657] [0.622, 0.657] p.e.
[0.596 0.715] [0.596 0.715] [0.596 0.715] [0.596 0.715] CI
[0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.035] bias
v=0.95 [0.622, 0.682] [0.622, 0.667] [0.622, 0.657] [0.622, 0.682] p.e.
[0.596 0.742] [0.596 0.726] [0.596 0.715] [0.596 0.742] CI
[0.018 −0.036] [0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.036] bias
v=0.90 [0.622, 0.710] [0.622, 0.679] [0.622, 0.657] [0.622, 0.709] p.e.
[0.596 0.774] [0.596 0.739] [0.596 0.715] [0.596 0.773] CI
[0.018 −0.038] [0.018 −0.036] [0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.038] bias
v=0.75 [0.622, 0.831] [0.622, 0.733] [0.622, 0.657] [0.622, 0.831] p.e.
[0.596 0.904] [0.596 0.799] [0.596 0.715] [0.596 0.905] CI
[0.018 −0.058] [0.018 −0.043] [0.018 −0.035] [0.018 −0.059] bias
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